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Abstract Many scholars claim that open access due to the
effective absence of state control is the major reason for the
overuse of common-pool resources such as fisheries. Based
on data from the Kafue Flats fisheries in Zambia, we argue
that the main problem in open-access situations is the
paradox of a state that is simultaneously absent and present:
present in actions that dismantle local fishery institutions
but absent when it comes to the ability to enforce the laws
that might protect the resources. Thus, the state is present in
the voice of immigrants from other parts of the country who
use their Zambian citizenship to legitimize free access to
the fisheries. But it is absent when the Department of
Fisheries is not able to enforce its own formal rules or
control these immigrants’ activities. Local groups are
unable to act collectively to reinstall new institutions due to
the absence of formal law enforcement. This paper analyses
this historic process of institutional change within the
theoretical framework of New Institutionalism. We test the
hypothesis that the main reason for the lack of local collective
action in the Kafue Flats is ideology (the notion of citizenship)
strengthening the bargaining power of external actors, who
profit most from open access constellations.
Keywords Fisheries management . African floodplain .
Common property regimes . Institutional change .
State and citizenship
Introduction
In the debate on the sustainable management of common-pool
resources, the effects of dismantling locally developed rules
by state control are widely discussed. In reaction to the
‘Tragedy of the Commons’ paradigm by Hardin (1968),
which claimed that resources held in common will inevitably
be overused, numerous studies have shown that not all
common property regimes caused resource degradation. A
comprehensive literature review by Agrawal (2003) argued
that common property regimes were at least as successful as
market, private, or state regimes in the management of
common-pool resources. The studies showed that the
emergence of open access situations is a consequence of
changing institutional frameworks. In many developing
countries common property regimes were not maintained
by the national governments. State control was introduced,
while means to implement and control the newly established
property regimes were limited. This led to a de facto open
access situation. In other words, if the state overrules local
institutions that would have managed common-pool resour-
ces yet lacks the capacity to provide adequate alternative
monitoring, then the resources will be free for all and
inevitably overused (see Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 2002;
Feeny et al. 1990; Acheson 1989). This has been shown for
the fisheries (for Africa generally see Haller 2005a; Chaveau
et al. 2000, for Nigeria, Thomas 1996, for Zambia (Lake
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Mweru region), Hilhorst and Aarnik 1999, for Kafue Flats,
Haller and Merten 2006; Haller 2007).
Yet, there are several indications that this analysis only
partly explains what is happening. Under weak state
control, traditional institutions might be revitalised (Berkes
1999, 20001), although they might be adapted or trans-
formed for new market conditions (Fay 1994, 2000;
Kassibo 2000; Beeler and Frei 2005; Fokou 2006). In this
case, the question arises why these revitalised local
institutions are unable to protect the resources. Also open
access to fisheries is not inevitably unsustainable. In some
traditional systems, seasonal open access was common and
did not necessarily negatively impact sustainable use (see
Thomas 1996). Resource utilisation becomes unsustainable
when access periods are prolonged and when open access
occurs in combination with demographic and technological
change or with man-made changes in ecological conditions
(dams, irrigation, climatic changes, etc). In these cases, the
question is why no mechanisms evolved at the local level to
counter the emerging overuse.
Based on empirical data on the fisheries in the Kafue
Flats, we argue that local inability to enforce communal
processes in order to protect the common-pool resources
must be seen in the context of the historical background of
nation-state building and later decentralisation, when
formal and informal property rights and power structures
were reshuffled. The nation state endows all citizens with
equal (access) rights, but the statutory regulations are not
fully enforced. Meanwhile, the state interferes with local
governance at several other levels, which may raise fears of
being controlled by imposed ‘traditional leaders’, or by
‘outsiders’ (Geschiere and Jackson 2006; Socpa 2006). If
statutory institutions are not fully implemented, local
institutions may fill the gap following principles of
subsidiarity. But who is entitled to craft or rebuild local
institutions? What role do local political leaders play since
decentralisation became the new development paradigm?
Who adequately represents ‘the community’ (Chaveau
2006; Berry 2006)? How are migrants represented? Problems
of legitimacy of local institutions arise not only for statutory
law, but also with respect to the legislative body. This
literature, mostly on land issues and the question of
autochthony, reflects how identities embedded in ideologies
of belonging and of the self can be used differently depending
on economic and political contexts. Formal legislation as well
as crafting or re-crafting local institutions can be a means to
control access to land and common-pool resources, especially
if the economic value of such a resource rises.
In this paper, we investigate the development of fishery
institutions in the Kafue Flats of Zambia from precolonial
times onwards. We then address the current situation of a de
facto open access constellation as a consequence of
institutional change. An important issue is the role of the
state, which is unable to enforce the fishery laws but endows
powerful actors with the ideology of citizenship. The state
gives all Zambians equal access to fisheries in this part of
Zambia and delegitimizes locally devised institutions, while
it fails to enforce statutory law. These paradoxical inter-
ventions of the state are discussed as a determinant for local
collective action since the turn of the millennium.
After an overview of the theoretical basis of New
Institutionalism, linked to African inland fisheries, and an
introduction to the research site and methodology, a
historical analysis of the institutional change of the fisheries
addresses the dynamics between local governance and the
colonial regime, and later the independent government.
Data from an ethnographic study then provide the basis for
an analysis of local collective action in the fisheries
between 2002 and 2007.
New Institutionalism and African Fisheries
Our analysis draws on the theoretical framework of New
Institutionalism (North 1990; Ostrom 1990; Becker and
Ostrom 1995; Ensminger 1992; Acheson 2003) which
emphasizes the role of formal and informal institutions,
such as property rights, rules, and regulations for the
governance of common pool resources. People have an
interest in institutions because they reduce costs of trans-
actions, providing clear arrangements of who is entitled to
utilize a resource when and where. Institutions regulate the
monitoring of agreements and enable the punishment of
violations (see Ostrom 1990; Becker and Ostrom 1995).
Many scholars, drawing on the seminal work of Douglas
North (1990) and Elinor Ostrom (1990), have provided in-
depth examinations of the characteristics of the institutional
frameworks necessary for sustainable resource use. How-
ever, less attention has been paid to historically-based
analyses of the sociopolitical processes which trigger
institutional change and influence the robustness of
institutions. An exception is the work of the anthropologist
Jean Ensminger (1992), whose analysis of pasture use
among the Orma in Kenya is based on North (1990). She
pointed out that in order to understand institutional change
related to common-pool resource management, issues of
power and ideology are crucial elements. Also the more
recent work of Arun Agrawal, who provides a review of
anthropological research on resource management, empha-
sises that in the analysis of the commons, power and
ideology issues between and within communities needs to
be analysed in historical depth (Agrawal 2001, 2003, 2005).
Locally developed institutions were in place for fisheries
in Africa before colonial and state rule which reduced
transaction costs for collective action by providing clear1 Berkes refers to the Cree hunters and fishermen in Canada.
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regulations for who can access the fisheries, when, under
what conditions (timing of use), with what equipment, and
with what related property rights. The conditions of use by
outsiders were also defined (Thomas 1996; Hilhorst and
Aarnik 1999; Chaveau et al. 2000; Bene et al. 2003a, b;
Haller 2005b; Haller and Merten 2006). These studies
support a basic assumption in common-pool resource man-
agement theory: Institutions regulating access to common-
pool resources—often in the form of common property
regimes—are of major importance for sustainable manage-
ment of fisheries, because they make resource use predictable
and reduce transaction costs, buffering risks in the use of a
mobile common-pool resource. But when the state extended
control over these common-pool resources for example,
enacting laws requiring licences and regulating closing times,
mesh size, etc, notions of ownership and management of
fisheries started to change. It subsequently became apparent
that the state institutions were unable to enforce access and
coordination regulations (see generally McCay and Acheson
1987; Acheson 1989, 2003; Feeney et al. 1990, for fisheries
specifically in Africa, see Thomas 1996; Moorehead 1989;
Fay 2000; Kassibo 2000).
Thomas (1996) provides a good illustration. He descries
locally developed institutions in the Hadejia Jama’are
Floodplain, Northern Nigeria, adapted to flooding patterns,
including open access constellations during high flood. It is
important to emphasise the temporal limitation of open
access, clear rules prevailed for most of the time. Thomas
shows how these rules were dismantled as the state took
over control and issued licences for commercial fishermen
as a form of re-regulation. But the state could not
adequately enforce its new law and serious over-fishing
occurred, provoking local conflicts (Thomas 1996). In the
Niger Inland Delta Floodplain, Mali, similar processes were
observed by Fay (1994, 2000) and Kassibo (2000). In this
case too, traditional institutions were in place until the state
intervened. However, after intervention by both the colonial
and postcolonial state, local institutions remained but were
transformed by powerful local leaders and state adminis-
trators with rent-seeking objectives who profited from their
knowledge of statutory regulations (see also Moorehead
1989; Beeler 2002; Frei 2004; Beeler and Frei 2005).
However, the question of why local people are not acting
collectively to fill the vacuum of governance under
inadequately implemented state law remains.
According to Elinor Ostrom (1990), several conditions
determine whether local people are able to craft robust
institutions for the management of common-pool resources.
She analysed well-operating local institutions and deduced
principles on which such robust institutions are based.
These include clear boundaries and information about
actors and constellations, monitoring, sanctioning and
conflict-resolution mechanisms (see Ostrom 1990 for full
list, see also Becker and Ostrom 1995). Most of these
principles can in fact be subsumed under transaction costs.
Thus robust institutions for the management of common-
pool resources are successful as long as they reduce costs for
transactions. Less discussed is the fact that a robust
institutional framework allowing sustainable resource man-
agement does not necessarily allow equity of access:
Powerful leaders may have an interest in managing resources
sustainably while excluding other users. If poverty reduction
is at stake, the robustness of an institution alone is not a
sufficient criterion of its success. It is thus important to
address local power relations explicitly.
The work of Jean Ensminger particularly puts more
emphasis on the role of bargaining power of actors for
the change—or maintenance—of existing institutions.
Ensminger’s analysis of the conditions for institutional
change provides a suitable framework to discuss why local
institutions can sometimes be recrafted during a vacuum of
governance, whereas in other cases no change occur, or
only change to the benefit of a few powerful stakeholders.
Ensminger looks at how ecological, demographic, techno-
logical, political, and social changes affect the value of
some resources or resource options (change in relative
prices). We would also include macroeconomic changes at
the national level and local microeconomic changes.
A pool of potential users will change and more actors will
become interested in using a resource as it increases in value
or as existing or alternative livelihood options become more
costly or less available. A resource may become more
interesting to more people and to more powerful stake-
holders when the expected profits are greater compared to
other opportunities. More powerful users will likely try to
renegotiate the institutional regulations in their favor.
Whether they succeed, or which groups are successful in
re-crafting (or impeding) regulations, will again depend on
the existing institutional framework and on external factors
endowing the stakeholders with material options and with
the legitimacy to independent institutional change.
Ensminger and Knight (1997) have pointed out the
importance of the ability of an actor to legitimate existing
or new institutions. In this context, the presence of a
socially anchored ideology, such as a discourse on
citizenship and the nation-state, or a political discourse of
indigenousness, ethnicity or autochthony, become impor-
tant strategic tools for local actors trying to renegotiate
access rights in the absence of a strong authority. Based on
these assumptions, we discuss the institutional change and
status quo in the Kafue Flats fisheries.
Ecology, Ethnography and Demography in the Kafue Flats
The Kafue Flats are a floodplain of 6,500 km2, of which
between 3,000 and 5,000 km2 are seasonally inundated.
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The whole basin covers an area of 154,000 km2 (see
Fig. 1). Despite having little annual rainfall, the area
receives a lot of water from the Kafue River, which has
its catchment areas north of the Copperbelt. This makes the
area rich in natural resources and an attractive place in a
semiarid region (800 mm annual rainfall). After the floods
recede, rich pastures, fishing grounds, and abundant
wildlife are available (Handlos 1977; Ellenbroek 1987;
Chabwela 1992; Hughes and Hughes 1992; Jeffrey et al.
1992). The area permanently has sufficient water due to the
Kafue River, and in the south-western parts, fertile alluvial
soils. Topographically, the area can be divided into woodlands,
termitaria, permanent swamps, ponds, lagoons, and levies.
There are three national parks in the Kafue Flats (Kafue,
Lochinvar and Blue Lagoon) and a Game Management Area
(GMA No. 11) where the use of wildlife is regulated. Most
important is the Lochinvar National Park, which covers a large
section of what was previously Ila, Balundwe and Batwa
territory, especially for pasture and fishing.
The most important fish species are bream, such as the
Kafue Bream or mpende (Orechromis andersonii and
different tilapia), so-called “bubble fish” or barbel (such
as the mbuli (Clarias gariepinus), and, especially in the
tributaries, the small cisekele (Striped Robber, Alestes
lateralis). Spawning and mobility patterns vary greatly for
these fish but are, as a general rule, linked to the flooding of
the area. At the start of the rainy season between November
and December the tributaries, which are by now dried up,
get water from their catchment areas and from the raising
Kafue River. Some of the fish species, such as sardines
(Alestes lateralis), then move out of the Kafue River and
the ponds near the tributaries in order to migrate up the
tributaries. In January and February, when the Flats start to
be flooded, bream and other species of fish spread for
spawning. Some head for specific locations, such as an area
called Hippo Corner in the Lochinvar Park. Others move
freely in the flooded area. The water reaches peak levels in
March and April, than recedes and the Flats dry out again
and water remains only in ponds, oxbows, and lagoons,
where some of the fish also stay (see Mortimer 1965;
Subramaniam 1992; Haller 2007). Other animals such as
crocodiles, which feed on fish, and hippos may also move
to the outer parts of the Flats (mentioned in Smith and Dale
1968; Haller 2007).
The early colonial administration recognized several
peoples in the area and referred to them with local terms:
the indigenous Batwa hunters and fishermen, and the
Ila/Balundwe agropastoralists. Maintaining the colonial
Fig. 1 The Kafue Flats and local ethnic groups (by C. Furrer based on map of S. Merten)
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definitions of ethnicity, the people are today still organised
in 14 chiefdoms.2 The Batwa live on the banks of the river,
but became a marginalised and stigmatized minority after
the immigration of Lozi and Bemba fishermen from western
and northern Zambia. They are respected for their magic
and knowledge of the river and lagoons, and specialise in
fishing with boats and, in former times hunting lechwe
antelope and other animals (Lehmann 1977; Haller 2007).
Today they also herd a few cattle, but their settlements on
the higher ground close to the riverbanks limit extensive
cattle herding.
The Lozi, who immigrated between 1930 and 1960, have
specialised in commercial fishing. They fish with nets and
sell most of the fish to outsiders and to a lesser extent to
local Ila and Balundwe. There are leaders in the permanent
villages that employ less wealthy people for fishing
activities (LaMunière 1969; Haller 2007). Apart from the
permanent communities there are fishermen from many
different ethnic groups, which the Bemba strongly repre-
sented, who only stay for a season and are highly mobile.
The largest group in the area, the Ila/Balundwe, are
transhumant pastoralists, whose main activity and source of
identity has remained cattle herding. After the water
recedes, they move with their cattle to the lush grazing
pastures close to the main river. However, other activities
such as fishing in tributaries, ponds and at cattle camps and
oxbows as well as collective hunting have been of major
importance for subsistence (Smith and Dale 1920(1986),
Cutshall 1980; Haller 2007)
In the past, the Ila and the neighbouring Balundwe3 lived
in large villages to protect themselves from slave and cattle
raids by the Lozi and from wild animal attacks. Following
the Pax Britannica, these big villages, headed by leaders
(mwami), broke up and today people live in villages made
up of scattered hamlets.
The more recent Tonga immigrants are mostly peasants
who keep fewer cattle than the Ila, which they do not bring
to the Kafue Flats for dry season grazing but keep nearby
their settlements. They also engage in fishing activities for
subsistence and increasingly in small-scale irrigation
horticulture (vegetables; Haller 2007).
The territory of Mbeza, where most of the research took
place, is about 1,500 km2 and has a population of 26,000
people (17 p/km2). The area is located in Namwala District,
which had an annual population growth rate from 3.12%
between 1964 and 1980 that fell to 1.97% between 1980
and 2000. The growth up to 1980 resulted from immigra-
tion but between 1980 and 2000, due to a collapse of
livestock production after a theileriosis epidemic, more
people were moving out of the area to urban centres.
Methodology
Between 2002–2004, extensive fieldwork was conducted
over a period of 12 months in the Kafue Flats (during two
6-month periods), followed by three site visits until 2007.4
Research was conducted mainly in the Chiefdom of
Nalubamba in the territory of Mbeza, (see Fig. 1), but
included several selected villages in neighbouring chief-
doms (Hamusonde, Choongo and Mwanachingwala). Both
quantitative and qualitative methods were used. A household
survey was carried out, including 13 villages within Chief
Nalubamba’s area (250 households in ten Ila and one Tonga
village), two Batwa villages on the north bank of the Kafue
River (52 households), three fishing camps in the border area
between the chiefdoms of Nalubamba and Hamusonde (70
households), and one fishing village closer to the urban
centres near Mazabuka in Chief Mwanachingwala’s area (28
households). The survey included questions about past and
present income generating activities, household assets, access
to resources (location and entitlements), and changes of
access to resources and the emergence of related conflicts.
Between one and four household members were interviewed,
and for this purpose, a local research team was specially
trained. In addition, we conducted economic survey of 31
male and 26 female fish traders, and 56 fishermen, which
provided quantitative information on commercial fisheries
and fish trade throughout all ecological zones within the Flats.
Participant observation over 12 months, 12 focus group
interviews, and oral history (resource related) allowed in-
depth insights into the contemporary local political setting,
illuminating local power-relations and institutional frame-
works, as well as institutional changes and conflicts in
traditional and commercial fisheries. During the study we
worked intensively with staff of local Fishery Departments
and attended meetings they held with local people and
2 We are fully aware of the problem of ethnic names as an often
colonial form of identification of groups and people. We are therefore
using these names because local people use them but are aware of
their different meanings in different contexts. There are 11 Ila and
three Balundwe (also labeled as Plateau-Tonga) chiefdoms. The Batwa
do not have their own chiefdom and are included in several chiefdoms
that have territories up to the riverbank.
3 See also Colson (1970), who calls these people Plateau Tonga. Smith
and Dale labeled them as Ila or Balundwe–Ila (Smith and Dale 1968).
The local people refer to themselves as Balundwe locally and also
Tonga if they are further away.
4 The research was part of a comparative research project AFWeP
(African Floodplain Wetlands Project) which is being carried out in
collaboration with the Department of Social Anthropology, University
of Zurich and the National Competence Centre in Research North
South, Switzerland. CPR institutions (fish, wildlife, pasture, forests,
water) and historical changes to them are being studied and compared
in six African floodplain areas in five African countries (see Haller
2002a, b, 2005a, b).
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commercial fishermen. This allowed important insights into
the interactions among the commercial fishermen, local
people, and the formal fishery sector.
Archival research carried out at the National Archives in
Lusaka and the Livingstone Museum in Livingstone con-
tributed to the historical context and provided information on
formal institutional change (laws, regulations etc).
Re-regulation Needed: Current Crisis in the Kafue Flats’
Fisheries
In the Kafue Flats, livelihoods have come under pressure
over the last two decades because of drought and an
epidemic affecting cattle culminating in a large-scale food
crisis during the lean season of 2002–2003. During this
crisis, the fisheries attracted people from other urban and
rural areas of Zambia, where loss of jobs due to the
economic crisis as well as crop failure and increasing maize
prices, drove them to seek alternative income-generating
activities. Large fishing camps of seasonal commercial
fishermen emerged in the Flats. As we visited various
chiefdoms to explain our research objectives, we experi-
enced a high level of tension with regard to the fisheries.
Concerns were expressed that regulations, such as the
formal fishery laws, were not enforced, and that conse-
quently overfishing would occur. In particular fishing with
small mesh-size net was perceived as destructive and
having an adverse distributional effect. During one of our
first meetings with the acting Chief in Hamusonde area,5
we were shown a piece of extremely fine-mesh cloth used
as a fishing net, widely perceived as destructive for
fisheries in the area. He informed us:
This type of net is the way people who come to our
place are fishing now. I was given this by my headmen.
We are very concerned about what is going on in the
fisheries (Acting headman Hamusonde August 2002).
The next time we visited the acting chief, we were
accompanied by three fishery officers. In an informal
meeting they accused the local people of using unsustain-
able fishing methods. Immediately, the blame was rejected
and linked to the immigration of ‘outsiders’ and to the
failure of the state to control these developments:
We always had plenty of fish! We were not fishing
anyhow. We had rules on when and how to fish. But if
I send my boy to the flats now, there are no fish. Or it
is too expensive and so I cannot buy fish. These
foreign fishermen are using bad techniques. (...). We
have been calling for the Fishery officers, but they
don’t show up! (a headman at chief Hamusonde’s
place, September 2002).
Local people, ‘the first-comers’ such as Batwa and Ila/
Balundwe including many permanently settled immigrant
Lozi fishermen, feared losing access to the fisheries to
outsiders who were often seasonal immigrants belonging to
the Lozi or Bemba ethnic groups. It was common to hear
them say that they wanted to ‘throw the Lozi and the Bemba
into the Kafue River’ because these people were taking all
the fish and using ‘destructive techniques.’ Yet the two
statements also illustrate the clear interest local Batwa and
Ila/Balundwe have in functioning regulations and sanction-
ing mechanisms. It must be made clear that these people
were not generally arguing that they were more entitled to
use natural resources due to their status as ‘autochthones.’As
will be shown, local groups had rules based on restricted
access, allowing outsiders to use fisheries with local
permission. However, in this case they tended to blame
outsiders with short-term interests for overexploiting and
destroying the resources by introducing bad fishing methods
and disregarding the statutory closed times. Resentment was
clearly expressed that no binding rules and regulations
existed since the state did not enforce the fishery law, and
local regulations were no longer respected (or only by some
of the people). Outsiders adhering to local rules and norms,
however, have (from a historical perspective) always been
absorbed, and they were even actively courted in order to
increase group strength and importance.
In the following section, we outline how the fisheries
were historically regulated, how the institutional framework
changed due to external political and economic changes,
and how the governance of the fisheries then oscillated
between the local people and the colonial and postcolonial
state. This is of major importance for the analysis. To assess
the actual situation related to the problem of collective
action we have to understand the diversity of locally
developed institutions, how and why they could be crafted
and how they worked and the change created by state
institutions. We then come back to our basic question of
why local institutions were not reinforced at the local level
if the problem of under-regulation seemed so evident, and
the interests of the majority of the local population involved
in fishing seemed so homogeneous.
Traditional Fishing Institutions: Accounts from Precolonial
Times
Fishery institutions had been established in precolonial
times. Fishing was regulated according to different seasons
in the Kafue River, the flats, oxbow lakes, lagoons, and in
the tributaries of the Kafue River. While the Batwa and
later the Lozi fished in the main river and bigger oxbows
5 The last Chief had died and an acting Chief was taking his place
until the election of a new Chief.
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and lagoons, the Ila and Balundwe fished in the tributaries,
ponds and oxbows in the flats.
The main feature regulating access to fish was the notion
of spiritual ownership (see also Smith and Dale 1968;
Haller 2007). The Ila and Balundwe established a basic
land tenure concept linked to their religion. A section of
land with clear boundaries, in which tributaries of the main
Kafue River and ponds as well as lagoons and oxbows are
located, was believed to belong to a specific village group.
Several villages together constitute a territorial unity (chichi)
with a specific name (for example "Mbeza" for the territory
of today's chiefdom Nalubamba). The village leader or big
man (mvami) was given the right to use and to supervise the
collective use of this area by the spirits (mizhimo) of the
founding patrilineal ancestors. These were worshipped at
sacred places in the compound as well as at graves, which
were places for rain making and forecasting events. These
spirits demanded offerings from the living as well as behavior
in accord with the territorial rules. Generally, the mwami was
in charge of organising such offerings. Ignoring the mizhimo
might result in sickness, bad yields and catches, as well as
natural disasters and fire (Haller 2007; see also Colson
(1970) for the notion of ancestral sprits among the Plateau
Tonga). The mwami appointed monitors (utamba) who
controlled tributary sections including ponds and oxbows,
allowing the mwami to establish their power over the area
and providing the legitimacy to distribute access to resources
and set conditions for this distribution (Haller 2007).
Fishing was open to all members of the community and
also to outsiders during high floods. There were however,
gender-specific rules for the use of techniques: men were to
fish with spears and women with baskets. Women some-
times had special fishing places, which they marked with
sticks (imbelo) indicating that nobody else was allowed to
fish there. There was a ban on making fires along the
Picture 1: A traditional monitor and ritual master (utamba) in Mbeza
(Ila-Chiefdom Nalubamba) performing a ritual before a collective
fishing event (T.Haller)
Picture 2: Ila Women with baskets during a collective fishing event
(lwuando). They are members of a local community or have been
invited to the fishing day form the local community. These invitations
are based on rules of reciprocity (T.Haller)
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tributaries in order to prevent people from camping there
for long periods. As the water gradually receded, men
established fishing weirs with fish traps. Part of the catch
had to be given to the owner of the place or the mwami
responsible for the place. This relatively open access ended
after the water stopped flowing. The utamba then had the
responsibility of ensuring that no fish were taken out of
tributary sections, ponds and oxbows before a major ritual
(kupa ila) was performed by him. He would announce a date
for a collective fishing event (lwuando). People gahering at
that day would have to wait for the utamba to make the ritual
(spitting water out and asking spirits for permission). Then
they could start fishing (see pictures 1 and 2). Violating these
rules would be punished by the ancestral spirits attacking in
the form of crocodiles and hippos, and with fines. Thus
access was strictly coordinated, regulated and controlled
between the time the floods began and receded and in the
early dry season. While collective fishing events could
include invitations to other villages and chiefdoms to
participate in fishing activities, it was also possible to
exclude resource users (Haller 2007).
The indigenous Batwa groups likewise controlled river
sections and claimed that ancestral spirits gave them the
legitimacy to do so. As hunters and fishermen, they fished
more intensively in laggons, oxbows, and in the main river
using wooden canoues. They developed a peculiar fishing
technique by installing a white cloth over a canoe to create
shadow which attracts the fish and makes them easier to
spear (MacLaren 1974; Haller 2007). No nets were used.
The Batwa controlled and protected specifically known
breeding grounds for bream, and fishing was forbidden in
these areas in the rainy season from November to February,
during which open access regimes otherwise prevail because
of flooding. Table 1 provides an overview of Ila/Balundwe
and Batwa fishing institutions that were adapted to flooding
patterns and costs of defendability. According to Ostrom’s
design principles, traditional fishery institutions of the Batwa
and Ila/Balundwe can be considered as having been robust
insofar as they worked well to reduce transaction costs and
regulated fishing in a common property regime. The result
seemed to be sustainable. Rivers were described as “loaded
full with fish” according to colonial missionary sources
(Smith and Dale 1968), or as “underused fisheries”
(Subramaniam 1992), or, according to informants among
Ila in Chiefdom of Nalubamba, simply as providing daily
additional and reliable protein resources in the past and a
basic resource for subsistence among the Batwa.
Institutional Change: State Ownership Replaces Local
Common Pool Resource Management
The first fundamental institutional changes occurred when
fishery laws were enacted in the 1930s. In the first two
decades of the twentieth century the fisheries in the Kafue
Flats, producing an estimated 2 metric tonnes annually,
were regarded as underdeveloped and as having an
enormous potential for feeding the urban sector (Smith
and Dale 1968; Mortimer 1965; Lehmann 1977). Conse-
quently, the colonial administration opened up Batwa areas
along the main river in the plain to commercial Lozi
fishermen, who were encouraged to move into the area. These
commercial fishermen started to use nets, which the Batwa
had not used. With only 6,500 people, the Batwa population
was too small to resist this influx and technology change, and
could only partly and informallymaintain their rules of access.
The first Lozi fishermen settled in the Ila/Balundwe
Chiefdoms of Nalubamba and Hamusonde and close to
some of the Batwa villages (e.g., the biggest village
Nyimba). They formed their own permanent villages close
to the riverbank or in the flats on higher ground, some of
them moving between permanent villages closer to the
woodlands in the flooding season and back to the flats in
the dry season. Some of these villages were tolerated and
even defended by local Ila/Balundwe chiefs. During this
time, the local Ila/Balundwe did not show a commercial interest
in the fishery sector, although fish had always been important
for subsistence. Hence, the immigrant fishermen were not a
threat to their access to the fisheries. On the contrary, they
enlarged the Ila and Balundwe chiefs’ spheres of influence.
The situation in the Kafue Flats’ fisheries changed in
1958, as the first copper crisis evolved. In order to
compensate for job losses in the mines more immigrants
came from the Northern Province and Lozi areas and
started using the fisheries on a larger scale (LaMunière
1969); fishing became more important as an income
generating option than before the crisis. In addition to the
initial permanent villages, seasonal fishing camps emerged.
Although the villages and the camps were locally under the
control of a headman, the main power lay with the so-called
draw-net or boat masters (see LaMunière 1969; Haller
2007)—successful fishermen owning boats and employing
other fishermen who can use the equipment during a
specific time of the week for their own catch.
It remains unclear to what extent this massive influx of
fishermen or the droughts6 influenced catches in the late
1950s. After the catches estimated by the colonial admin-
istrators went up from 2 to 10 metric tonnes annually after the
opening of the area, they dropped to less than 3 metric tonnes
annually before 1960 (Mortimer 1965). The declining catches
in the Kafue Flats, then attributed to overuse, motivated the
colonial administration to design specific fishing laws for the
6 Generally larger inundation is statistically related to an increase in
fish production in African floodplains (see also Loth 2004 for
floodplains in West Africa).
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Kafue Flats that were introduced in 1962 (Mortimer 1965)
and resulted in catches rising again between the 1960s and
1970s (see also Mortimer 1965; Muyanga and Chipundu
1982; Subramaniam 1992). Although it is unclear to what
extent the regulations contributed to a regeneration of the
fisheries, the fact that they seemed to recover justified the
new laws in of the eyes of the public and the state. During
this time, the state did invest in the control of the fisheries
providing ships, transport, offices in all the districts and
on provincial levels and local and scientific staff and
equipment.
From Independence to the Early 1990s
Zambia became independent in 1964 and President Kenneth
Kaunda, formulated as one of his primary goals the
development of rural and remote areas. However this mainly
concerned the agrarian sector, and wildlife and fishery
management continued as it had under the colonial admin-
istration, although the Department of Fisheries was moved
from theWildlife Department to the Agricultural Department
(today subsumed in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture).
Initially after district fishery officers carried out governance
of the fisheries at the district level for issuing licences and for
monitoring and enforcing the fishery laws in their section.
The Kafue Flats were divided into four sections, mostly
according to the district boundaries: Mazabuka, Monze,
Namwala, and Iteshiteshi Districts. These sections cover at
least 80 km or more of the Kafue River. The management of
the tributaries, lagoons and oxbows of each of the sections
should have theoretically been included, but efforts concen-
trated on the commercial fisheries along the main river. At
that time the Department of Fisheries was well equipped with
officers and infrastructure including speed boats, cars and
scientific equipment. Not only did the officers supervise and
enforce the fishery laws but researchers kept track of the
development of the fisheries in the country.
But problems in the fisheries reemerged as the state slid
into an economic crisis related to international and national
economic changes. Copper prices were declining since
1975 before they plunged dramatically in the 1990s.
Coupled with the oil crisis during this period and with the
continued socialist policies of the President Kenneth
Kaunda, expenditure (import substitution and subsidised
agriculture) grew leaving Zambia one of the ten poorest
countries in the world and with one of the highest debts in
the region (Anderson et al. 2000; Ferguson 1999). The fact
that catches declined again to 4–6 metric tonnes in the
Table 1 Fishery regimes according to season among Ila, Balundwe and Batwa
Season Where Regime Rules Technology
and name
Costs of economic
dependability
Rains (Dec–Feb) Tributaries,
ponds and
river sections
CLOSURE
COMMUNAL
COLLECTIVE
(people from
Chichi and others)
Breeding areas
at the river
LOW
Fishing in village
and Chichi reciprocity
Baskets(women);
Spears (men); Ikuo
HIGHER
Floods (Feb–April) In all
inundated areas
OPEN ACCESS No rules, exception:
breeding areas at river,
no fireplace, imbelo
place
Boats, Spears,
Tonga baskets (women)
HIGHEST (low for
specifically known
places, end of season)
Weirs (buyeelo)
Retreat (May–July) river, ponds
and tributaries
CLOSURE
PRIVATE
COMMUNIAL
COLLECTIVE
When water stops
flowing, invitation
by rit. master
reciprocity
No fishing in restricted
areas. Some weirs
(buyeelo) still allowed
HIGHER To LOW
Lwuando controlled
Ila baskets and Spears
Dry (Sept–Nov) river, tributary
and ponds
COMMUNIAL
TO CLOSURE at Kafue
river Batwa
still fish
Reciprocity rit.
master closes
when little water
Lwuando, Spears at
river boats (Batwa)
LOW
Source Haller (2007)
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1980s and 1990s (see Subramaniam 1992), may be
interpreted as a growing inability of the government to
implement the laws effectively. At the same time pressure
on the fisheries increased because many jobless people
from the industrialised areas began to turn to fishing.
The increasing problems in the fisheries were once more
countered with refined fishery laws. The national Fishery
Law of 1974 and the statutory amendments of 1986 clearly
stipulated that everyone fishing commercially in the Kafue
Flats had to get a licence and must use nets with mesh sizes
no smaller than 76 mm. A closing and breeding time
between December and February was established, during
which no commercial fishing may take place. But given the
shrinking resources of the fishery departments these laws
were not implemented effectively. Many forbidden fishing
techniques were used. Illegal draw nets including shed
cloth and mosquito nets had the worst and most obvious
effects on the juvenile fish population.
However, use of destructive techniques and lack of
effective enforcement of regulations were not the only
problems contributing to declining catches in the Kafue
Flats. Two dams for hydroelectric power production had
been built, one upstream of the Kafue Flats (Iteshiteshi
1978), one downstream (Kafue Gorge 1972). The decline of
catches in the 1980s was also a consequence of the
changing flooding pattern after the construction of the
upstream dam (Chooye and Drijver 1995), which, while not
so much affecting the fish population as a whole did alter
its distribution.
During the 1990s structural adjustments and privatisa-
tion programmes were implemented by the Chiluba
government. But debt and aid policies tended to lessen
the monetary resources available for formal jobs (Anderson
et al. 2000). Comparable to the situation after the initial
sharp decline of copper prices in the mid 1970s there was a
sudden and massive reduction in state income. However,
one of the major differences from the 1970s was the
relatively high price of fish compared to other commodities.
Between 1980 and 2000 there was a high rate of inflation,
which made the prices of all goods rise considerably. But,
the price of maize rose by only nine times, whereas fish
prices increased approximately 17-fold in Lusaka, making
fishing and the fish trade particularly attractive. Addition-
ally, the monitoring of the fisheries had de facto ceased to
exist in any way and therefore it became impossible to control
these increasing fishing activities (Haller 2007, also Scudder,
pers. com. 2003).
De facto Open Access, Gains to be Made, and the Effects
on the Fisheries in the New Millennium
The increasing price of fish on the national market and the
considerable gains to be made from commercial fishing and
fish trading in combination to low access costs due to the
lack of regulation enforcement by the state led increasing
number of people to take up this opportunity. The pressure
on the Kafue Flats fisheries was now much higher than in the
1970s, at the same time that control of the main river areas by
the state was much lower due to lack of financial resources.
Between 2002 and 2003 statutory fishery institutions were
hardly in place in the more remote areas. Most of the Kafue
Flats Fishery Departments did not have their own car and a
motorbike was a rare privilege. If a vehicle was available, the
money for repairs or fuel was often lacking. As a
consequence, the fishery officers failed to monitor licences,
fishing gear, and closed periods. In addition, some (not all)
officers topped up their salaries with fish trading in violation
of the closed period. However, they also tried to set up
participatory, subsidiary mechanisms of control by forming
fishery committees which would, at least to some extent, try
to implement some of the regulations.
While some of these problems had started with the
decline of state finances in the mid-seventies, the situation
was now exacerbated by rising maize prices. During the
food crisis, the fishing camps in the Kafue Flats and along
the tributaries grew well beyond their former sizes (former
sizes not going higher than 50 to 60 households). In 2002,
we counted over 900 households (often single males) in one
such camp. Fish traders from the region as well as from
Lusaka bought fish in these camps or at the regular fish market
that took place twice a week in Lochinvar Park.Monthly gains
for a trader from Lusaka travelling once a week to a fish
market could be up to 1.4 m ZMK (320 US$; 80 US$ times
four, see Table 2), which was double the salary of a local
Fishery Department officer. It became impossible for the
local fishing committees and the headmen to control the
activities in these camps. But even if they could have
intervened, they would likely have been reluctant to do so
during a food crisis with so many people hungry and given
the lack of support from the police and fishery officers.
Although official estimates are unreliable we summarize
them and compare them with estimates of local fishery
officers and local fishermen. According to official national
data on the Kafue Flats Fisheries the annual catches were
reduced from 10 to 6 metric tonnes between 1970 and
2000. Local fishery officers, however, estimated that annual
catches are between 3 to 2 metric tonnes (interviews with
local DoF in Kafue Flats in 2002 and 2004).7 Despite the
methodological problems associated with these estimates,
data from our research based on local people’s estimates
support this assumption. In a household survey in Monze
7 Since the mid-1990s it has been difficult for the Department of
Fisheries to gather scientific data due to lack of funds, therefore the
quality of the data is questionable.
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District (Balundwe or Plateau-Tonga), in Chief Chongo’s
and Chief Hamusonde’s area, all household heads from six
fishing villages (Nyimba, Shimungalu, Chiko, Nakumba,
Nakasale, Nswilile) engaged in fishing were asked about an
estimated change in catches compared to 5 years ago. In
addition, we surveyed household heads involved in fishing
from seven villages in the woodlands (Mwanamwale,
Namachila, Nalubamba, Matala, Kasoka, Shikapande,
Mutinta Mushala). Local people reported catches have
dropped between 25–50% the last 5 years at the individual
Picture 3: A seasonal fishing camp in the Kafue Flats where commercial fishing is taking place and that is visited by fish traders from town. These
camps often lack law and order. Health and sanitation facilities do not exist (T. Haller)
Picture 4: Commercial fishermen using a large draw net made out of fine meshed shed cloth or mosquito net (chukukula). Local people and the
Department of Fisheries consider these techniques as being destructive. Due to de facto open access such fishing methods cannot be banned (T.Haller)
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level.8 In our interviews and focus group discussions local
fishermen also mentioned that the varieties have changed
(e.g., the red breasted bream is no longer common), and
that the size of the bream (tilapia and oreochromis)
declined. In the Batwa fishing village Nyimba, where a
lot of immigrant fishermen have settled, catches were also
reported to have declined. However, the lowest catches are
reported from fishing camps such as Shimungalu (Mazabuka
District, Chiefdom of Mwanachingwala) to the far east and
Namwala (Namwala District) to the far west of the Kafue
Flats. In these two areas, the catches in the last 5 years were
said to have gone down between 50–75%.9 Fishermen from
these districts now travel further up and down the Kafue
River in search of fishing grounds that are less plundered.
For many local people, getting access to fish for local
consumption has become difficult even if the catches in
some areas were still good, as the following statement
illustrates:
If I send my boy out with the bicycle to get some fish
in the flats he comes home with empty hands because
all the fish are gone. The few fish there are, are sold to
traders and are too expensive for us. (Headman from
Bweengwa, Monze District, focus group interview
2002)
Ideological Justification of Access to Fisheries
and Conflicts: The Paradox of the Presence–Absence
of the State
The gains to be made in the fisheries led to a shift in
interests among people from urban and other areas of
Zambia as well as for local people, and increased the
competition in which the main question of who is entitled
to control access to fishing areas emerges. The different
stakeholders used different ideologies and discourses to
legitimize their access and their fishing techniques. The link
to identity is crucial here because it is in this way that
legitimacy is established, which increases the bargaining
power of the actors involved in order to transform or
maintain institutional regimes. On the one hand, open
access is most profitable for commercial users and for
traders, who are very mobile. The use of citizenship is their
strongest ideological asset. On the other hand, some local
interest groups would be more interested in a combination
of locally and state enforced rules, limiting access to the
fisheries to obtain better distribution in favour of small–
scale fishing. However, this is difficult because the state,
which could give stronger legitimacy to the local level
groups, is absent. This leads us back to the initial question
of why collective action has not been possible so far in
order to reregulate access to the fisheries.
By 2002, traditional institutions regulating access to the
fisheries had been severely eroded. This was particularly
the case for the fishing in the tributaries. Commercial
fishermen had begun to also intrude into these fishing
grounds close to the woodland villages of the Ila and
Balundwe, which up to now, had been managed by the
headman and traditional monitors (utamba). Discussions
with local people, including many fishermen, in structured
and unstructured interviews and focus groups meetings
between 2002 and 2004 revealed that the majority of the
stakeholders wanted to stop the uncontrolled fishing.
Complaints especially cited the large small-mesh nets that
catch fish when they are too small, and even take the eggs
of bream. The disturbance of breeding places is also
mentioned, alongside the need to enforce closed times for
commercial fisheries. But equally important and strongly
unifying interests were concerns about social developments
such as alcoholism, violence, and prostitution in the fishing
camps (Haller and Merten 2006; Merten and Haller 2007).
In this context, the distinction between locals and outsiders
was blurred: it had become a matter of controlling the
young, unemployed men and preventing violent outbursts.
Given the fact that the state is absent and local people
could in fact manage their resources on their own, an
explanation is needed as to why it is impossible for this
Table 2 Profits of fish traders according to place of sale (converted from Zambian Kwacha to US$)
Place of sale No of fish traders Mean profit per trip ZMK (US$) Mean expenses per trip ZMK (US$) Net profit ZMK (US$)
Local villages 7 125,000 (27.7) 10,000 (2.3) 115,000 (25.4)
Rural area (within 50 km) 16 115,000 (25.4) 18,000 (4.0) 97,000 (21.4)
Small towns 6 140,000 (31.2) 100,000 (23.0) 40,000 (8.2)
Lusaka 6 760,000 (168.8) 400,000 (88.8) 360,000 (80.0)
Source: Surveys made by the authors between 2002 and 2004 in Chiefdoms Nalubamba(Mbeza), Hamusonde (Bweengwa), and Chongo
(Banakaila), 1$=4,500 Zambian Kwacha)
9 Data stem from a survey in two fishing camps in both areas and from
interviews with local DoF staff in 2002 and 2004.
8 There is a difference between an overall decline of fish and a decline
of individual catches. The fact however that in some areas no fish at
all could be caught was reported as a new phenomenon, supporting
the absolute decline of the fish population.
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large group of people, which included the local headmen,
fishing committees, and many permanently settled fisher-
men from different origins, to prevent a minority of
seasonal immigrants and locals from using harmful fishing
techniques, selling all the fish to outsiders and ignoring
closed periods. This minority was violating all regulations,
and was often responsible for violent conflicts in the camps
or while fishing.
The lack of collective action partly relates to the absence
of any backing from the state for those who were locally
responsible for law and order, such as the headmen and
chiefs. Angry participants at a meeting in September 2002
were in full agreement with the following statement made
to local fishery staff, who were visiting the local authorities
for the first time:
There are many problems in the camps. We have been
waiting for you for so long to enforce the law but you never
show up! (A headman, Chief Hamusonde area, 2002).
The compliant said that they went to the fishing camps
to confiscate illegal nets but that they were harassed, in
particular by young seasonal fishermen. Another headman
added:
We were told to move, otherwise they would beat us
up! They said that they were Zambians and had a
licence. We had no right to tell them how to fish. We
are scared because they are strong (Another headman,
Chiefdom Hamusonde, Bweengwa)
Seasonal immigrants legitimize their right to fish on the
grounds of Zambian citizenship. But at the same time they
deny the traditional authorities the right to enforce the law
at the local level. The local authorities, who were legally
entitled to solve many issues on property rights by the
government, were immobilized by this argument. At the
same time, government officers and police were rarely seen
in the area, in part because they lacked means of transport.
After a violent outburst in one camp in 2002, the local
authorities called for the state police. They reported in this
same meeting that the police promised to come but never
showed up. The official explanation was lack of transport.
It became evident that there have been several vain
attempts by local people to actively enforce existing formal
state rules. But the ideology of citizenship as used by seasonal
immigrants was a very powerful tool for seasonal immigrants
in concrete action arenas (Ostrom 2005). It enabled them to
justify free access to fish and to fishing technologies, to
increase their bargaining power, and to undermine the
bargaining power of local people. The ideology of citizen-
ship worked so well in this context because in the eyes of
local people, the state is the body which having dismantled
local institutions legitimately manages the fisheries. Never-
theless, in many interviews and conversations with focus
groups, local stakeholder groups said that they would like to
change the de facto open access to fisheries. Local Ila and
Balundwe made a clear link between commercial interests
and local basic livelihoods:
We always had fish. But now, if I want to get fish from
the flats and I send my boy out, he returns with
nothing. There is fish but very little and it is bought up
by traders for people in the town (Ila man, 40 years,
Mbeza, 2002).
It is accepted that given the local economic crisis, more
people rely on fish. However, opposition emerged when the
local people feared complete exclusion from their ‘own’
resources by external, powerful commercial fishermen. Fish
have always been important to the Ila and Balundwe,
particularly as a complementary protein-rich food during
the lean season, as evidenced by the many traditional
regulations for fisheries that existed (Smith and Dale 1968;
Haller 2007).
The indigenous Batwa, who have become a minority,
were particularly affected by the developments in the
fisheries. Their numbers fell from 6,500 to about 1,000
people, and in one of the most important settlements,
Nyimba, located at the Kafue River close to Lochinvar
National Park, they account for only one-fifth of the
population. Batwa suffer from being stigmatized as inferior
to other people, who claim ideologically to be superior and
therefore—as modern citizens—to claim more rights.
Batwa from the settlement of Nyimba complained bitterly
about seasonal immigrants not following the rules of
fishing, using destructive techniques and especially fishing
in zones where local people know that fish (bream) are
making nests and breeding. The Batwa say that the open
access and illegal methods mean fish are now less available
to them. The loss of hope of being able to continue
managing the resource base is commonly stated in inter-
views. The following position is typical:
All right, fish are there. But nowadays fish are taken
by many people who come here from many parts of
Zambia. They use illegal and bad methods of killing
fish. And so fish stocks are declining. Now getting
food from fish is difficult because fish numbers are
dwindling all the time. So we have no faith in fish
(interview with a Batwa representative from Nyimba
2002).
The failure to stop the permanent use of these techniques
and the perceived selling out of the fisheries in the area
without any regulation without respecting seasons and
closing times made many local stakeholders very angry.
During interviews and meetings during 2002 and 2004, we
often heard the statement: “We want to throw the Lozi and
the Bemba into the river”.
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This paradox of the absence and presence of the state is a
reason for local inaction, and fosters the recourse to
ethnically or autochthony-shaped strategies and identities.
This process can be seen in other contexts in Africa as has
been recently documented, especially in debates over
access to land (Geschiere and Jackson 2006; Evers et al.
2005; Kuba and Lentz 2006; Lund 2007). Although these
authors do not emphasize the link between changing
relative prices and disputes over autochthony, case studies
such as Lund (2007), Chaveau (2006), and Berry (2006),
indicate clearly that specific identities of belonging are
linked to the perception of interests generated by changing
political and economic constellations. Identity is then a
strategically used asset and linked to ideologies, discourses
and narratives of belonging to an area giving legitimacy to
its exclusive use, or for the taxation of, in this context,
defined non-autochthonous users. But the case of the Kafue
Flats provides an alternative context: here autochthony is
not an asset, because of the paradox of the present–absent
state which increased the bargaining power of mobile
outsiders such as fishermen and traders.
The Problem of Local Heterogeneity of Interests
However, we also have to look more deeply into the
differentiation of local actors, because the current economic
problems, which are related to institutional, climatic and
economic changes in the area, lead to heterogeneity in local
interests. The crisis in the cattle economy and the loss of
subsidies for agriculture, have pushed younger local men to
look for alternative livelihood strategies. Realising that
autochthony does not really pay in this context, while gains
from commercial fisheries and from selling fish are high,
they take any possible advantage in disregard of local rules,
which can be seen as free riding from within the community;
collective fishing used to be a market-like event where
people from several villages met. Now the collective fishing
rules are ignored by some young men, who go fishing with
nets before the collective fishing days are announced by the
monitors, and then sell the fish and invest the money, e.g., in
grocery stores. In debates the young men state that they feel
they are Zambians and not locals and that their activity is a
legal business strategy for fisheries that are managed by the
state. In addition, they mention the classic prisoners dilemma.
If they do not take all the fish, some commercial fishermen
would. Their strategies also include other activities regarded
as illegal in the traditional system. Tributaries are increasingly
used for commercial fishing by outsiders and by these young
local men, while women get marginalized. Local men are
starting to fish with baskets, traditionally the women’s fishing
technique that allows for larger catches than spears, the men’s
technique. This jeopardizes the subsistence of very small-
scale commercial fishing, which is particularly important for
women from poorer families in order tomaintain food security
during the lean season before the harvest period. Some of the
women resort to ‘fish for sex’ deals with commercial fisher-
men and they often trade fish during closed times outside of
the area, profiting from the high prices (Merten and Haller
2007). All these activities are newer types of livelihood
strategies of heterogeneous actors, which the majority of
local people see as free-riding.
It has been argued that in small-scale societies with
homogenous interests, local people should be able to act
collectively (Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990; Ensminger 1992;
Agrawal and Gibson 1999). But the local communities can
no longer be interpreted as small-scale societies with
homogenous interests because they are now integrated into
much larger networks and markets. Thus local, traditional
institutions face more free riding as they hinder livelihood-
critical gains in the new context. One could therefore argue
that most of the local people are not interested in re-
regulation or re-crafting of new institutions or revitalisation
of old institutions. But this does not match the results of our
surveys and focus groups where the majority of people
clearly stated that they were looking for any kind of new
enforceable regulation to change the situation. However,
what was lacking was the possibility to legitimately act
collectively in a domain that should be controlled by the
state but is in fact not controlled at all.
Local By-laws: A Democratic and Subsidiary Solution?
In this situation the local fishery officers met with local
authorities and several interested men and women from the
Chiefdom of Hamusonde in order to discuss possible
solutions. Both parties expressed a great interest in subsidiary
comanagement between the state and the local authorities. In
Zambia it is possible to issue by-laws on the District level
that can be set up according to the existing fishery laws. This
initiative was developed by local staff of the Department of
Fisheries in Mazabuka District and was also taken up by
other districts as a result of our research. These by-laws were
drafted in a participatory manner, in order to enable local
stakeholders (commercial fishermen, local village people
fishing in tributaries, Batwa groups, women’s groups, male
and female fish traders, and chiefs’ representatives) to
discuss how they want to manage the fisheries on the local
level. This local initiative was later financed by the World-
Fish Centre, a CGIAR organisation, but remained purely
local. One main feature was that it did not only address the
chiefs as main representatives of the local groups, but
recognised the sometimes contested position of chiefs and
tried to incorporate as many different factions as possible,
including male and female fish traders. The idea of
developing local by-laws based on revitalised local institu-
tions (for example strengthening rules of collective fishing,
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gender related techniques, and strengthening the river
monitors) and the statutory regulations alike, was taken up
in neighbouring chiefdoms. It should be noted that apart from
some logistical support to facilitate meetings, no financial
incentive was present to promote this process. Nevertheless it
continued through the initiatives of the local stakeholders.
Although the process of implementing by-laws formally
had not been completed by the end of 2007, some local
authorities started to introduce them in their areas. The fact
that these more formal regulations existed motivated many
of the migratory fishermen to comply with the local
regulations, or to move to other areas. Since then, a clear
effect of these—although still informal—institutions can be
observed. In 2007, local people told us that there are now
more fish and that they face fewer problems with seasonal
fishermen than they did before the initiative.
Discussion and Conclusion
The current crisis in the Kafue Flats fisheries cannot be
discussed without analysing institutional change from a
historical perspective and without linking it to external
changes. Based on the approach of New Institutionalism it
is crucial to understand how the fisheries were managed in
the past and how the rules had been altered overtime.
Historical depth provides knowledge of how local people
were able to act collectively, how the fisheries institutions
were working, and also which rules are still present and
which have been eroded. It is also important to understand
what centralised resource management means and how de
facto open access situations can emerge. Particularly, it
helps in assessing the role of ideology and the different
actors’ bargaining power in changing or maintaining
institutional settings that suit their interests. The approach
shows how economic crises influence institutional change,
and how the strategic use of the ideology of citizenship and
modernity modifies the bargaining power of actors.
Following Ensminger (Ensminger 1992; Ensminger and
Knight 1997), fisheries in the Kafue Flats are contested
because relative prices for fish have increased and at the
same time regulation of access to the fisheries is unenforce-
able by a weak state. This increased the incentives for
commercial seasonal fishermen and traders from all over
Zambia. The external factors driving these changes, relate to
the Zambian economic situation, particularly its dependence
on copper, which has led to low state income and to declining
job opportunities in the industrialised centres. In addition,
further external changes have contributed to the increasing
attractiveness of the fisheries, lowering the costs of access
for seasonal immigrants: climatic and ecological changes
(less rain, changes of flooding patterns, cattle disease, etc.)
made the area more accessible, political, economic (neglect
of agricultural production), and technological (new nets and
boats) changes made the commercial use of fish more
attractive compared to other alternatives10.
However, in order to achieve access to fisheries, the
production of legitimacy is important. Despite the fact that
local users define themselves as locals, as autochthonous,
the very fact that fishing rules happen to be state
regulations limits collective action. It does so because
formally fisheries are managed by the state and local people
are obliged to, and do, refer to the state to enforce
regulations. “Non-autochthonous” users or immigrants
denying compliance with local rules were in a strong
position by making reference to the ideology of state
citizenship and modernity, legitimating access for citizens
and legitimating non-compliance with local ‘traditional’
authorities, while the government officials were physically
absent to control the regulations formally in effect. This
constellation increases the bargaining power of mobile
outsiders and hinders collective action at the local level as
long as the state does not enforce rules and regulations
regarding the management of the Kafue Flats fisheries. For
non-autochthonous users it is easy to refer to state authority
by having or claiming to have a license. The fact is that
here citizenship and not locality or belonging is crucial.
This resource is ideological and it is linked with the notion
of citizenship, equality (we are all Zambians), and legality
(only reference to the state’s legal norms suffices in the
situation of the absence of the state). But in reality, it is the
result of an institutional change from a common property
regime via state property to de facto open access. Open
access then is the best option for highly mobile fishermen
and traders. The only possibility for local stakeholders to
react in this situation would be physical action without the
state, which was also mentioned by some angry locals. But
this kind of action is not legitimate and could lead to police
or military reactions against local people.
The only tentative attempt to mitigate the situation was
the initiative of local staff of the Department of Fisheries,
mostly starting on their own, to delegate power and produce
new forms of local institutions accepted by local Districts.
This produced the kind of legitimacy needed for local
collective action. Nevertheless, despite early positive results,
the by-law project will only last if the state shows a minimal
commitment. The major positive aspect is that a process of
participatory consent—a kind of constitutionality—has been
possible. Although it needed start-up help from outside the
communities, this is hardly a criticism, as the problems
mostly stemmed from outside the communities.
10 Copper prices have again risen from 2003 to today but large parts of
the Zambian copper industry are privatised and therefore the state does
not profit from copper the way it was before. Although the state now
may have more revenue, it is unclear how this will be distributed.
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